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ABSTRACT
The last two decades of the XX century have been marked by a vigorous acceleration of
international economic integration both at a global and regional level. States accepted
pervasive constraints on their national decision-making in the hope that stability and
predictability would favor economic growth. This model of international economic inte-
gration, however, has recently shown worrying signs of ‘disintegration’. Disintegration
manifests itself both as disintegration of the international legal regimes which compose
the international economic order; and disintegration through law, namely the social,
economic andenvironmental disintegrationphenomena, triggeredor at least facilitatedby
these regimes. Relying on the paradox integration/disintegration as an analytical frame-
work, this article draws a blueprint of the various disintegration phenomena, which are
further analyzed in the individual contributions to this Special Issue. It seeks to identify a
relationship between the twodimensions of disintegration anddetect possible correlation
patterns. Last, after engaging with the different normative alternatives put forward by
the contributors, it concludes by calling for a rethinking of the traditional approach to
international economic integration. This reconceptualization should be premised on the
full realization that the current model entails a great deal of environmental and social
‘hidden costs’.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, the word ‘globalization’ has taken center stage in the public
debate. This buzzword resonated through the halls of parliaments and universities, the
* This Special Issue is the result of a long journey that started with the conference ‘The Era of Disintegration:
Taking Stock of the Dynamics of International Economic Governance in the First Two Decades of the
XXI Century,’ held at Erasmus University Rotterdam on 16 November 2018. We would like to thank the
Erasmus Initiative for Dynamics of Inclusive Prosperity for the kind financial support, which made the
conference possible. We would also like to thank all the contributors to this Special Issue, the participants
to the aforementioned conference and the editorial board of the Journal of International Economic Law for
their valuable feedback on an earlier version of this article. Last access to all websites 5 June 2020. The usual
disclaimer applies. This article is the result of the joint work of the authors and reflects their shared views. For
the purposes of the evaluation of our work by Italian academic institutions, we declare that the Introduction,
sections 2, 2.B, and 3 were jointly drafted, section 1 was drafted by Francesco Montanaro, and sections 2.A
and 2.C by Federica Violi.
** Respectively Dual PhD in International Economic Law at Bocconi University/Paris Panthéon-Assas and
Assistant Professor in International Law at Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits
non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not
altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact
journals.permissions@oup.com
• 299
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jiel/article/23/2/299/5871454 by Erasm
us U
niversity R
otterdam
 user on 23 Septem
ber 2020
300 • The Remains of the Day
meeting rooms of cabinets and TV studios around the world. Despite or, probably,
owing to its fuzzy and multifarious meaning, it added a further element of polarization
to the political spectrum and even undermined inveterate ideological allegiances.1
Although it is not possible to embark here on a thorough analysis of the meaning or
meanings of this word, it is safe to say that the supranational legal framework governing,
in its various forms, trade in goods and services as well as capital flows constitutes a
paramount aspect of this phenomenon.
The system that emerged after World War II, particularly after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, seemed unassailable and indestructible. This is due, at least to some
extent, to the fact that international economic integration materialized as a legalistic
project. International trade and investment protection rules, although through different
legal techniques, seek to remove or at least curtail hindrances to international economic
transactions by durably harnessing States’ freedom of action.
However, thismodel of international economic integration has recently shown signs
of distress. A series of events—such as climate change, Brexit and theWTOcrisis—has
called into doubt the very existence of the international economic order as we know it.
Disintegration, understood in a broad sense, has affected its functioning over the last
couple of years.
This article and the contributions included in this Special Issue seek to show that
the modus operandi of the supranational economic rules and institutions has triggered
disintegration trends onmany levels. Ourmain claim is that disintegration, understood
in a broad sense, is to a certain extent a reaction to international economic integration.
A cautionary note, however, is in order. By taking this perspective, this special
issue does not aim to sound the death knell for all types of international economic
integration. Nor does it wish to provide ‘ammunitions to the barbarians’ or stoke
up the appetite for simplistic and chauvinist solutions. Rather, it seeks to chart the
various manifestations of these disintegration phenomena. Disintegration, in our view,
is a broad and two-faceted concept. On the one hand, disintegration is understood
as the impact of international economic rules on socio-economic structures and the
environment (disintegration through law). On the other hand, disintegration is also a
phenomenon eroding international economic regimes2 and institutions (disintegration
of law).
Relying on the paradox integration/disintegration as an analytical framework, the
authors of this Special Issue reflect on the current ‘integrationist’ model with the aim
to: (1) provide a deeper understanding of the interaction between ‘integrationist’ inter-
national economic norms and disintegration patterns; (2) combine law, economics,
and political sciences, in order to critically examine the conceptual underpinnings of
international economic law and policy making; and (3) engage in a normative exercise
to envision newmodels of integration.
1 Albena Azmanova, ‘After the Left–Right (Dis)continuum: Globalization and the Remaking of Europe’s
Ideological Geography’, 5 (4) International Political Sociology 384 (2011), at 385.
2 For the purposes of this contribution, we use the term ‘regime’ in its broadest understanding, without
assigning any specific qualification to it.
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As groundwork, this article sets the scene for the analysis of the specific manifes-
tations of disintegration carried out in the various contributions to this Special Issue.
In section 1, after briefly recounting the history of the international economic order
from the end ofWorldWar II to nowadays, we argue that the post-ColdWar ‘neoliberal
turn’ of the international economic order sowed the seeds of disintegration. In section
2, we explore both dimension of disintegration, of law and through law, building on the
insights of the contributors. Finally, in section 3, we conclude that such disintegration
phenomena call for bold and imaginative action—andone that is not necessarily geared
toward ‘ever greater’ economic integration.
I. UNPACKINGTHEDISINTEGRATIONPARADOX
When looking at the evolution of the system of international economic relations that
emerged at the end of World War II, one can clearly discern a pattern of increasing
legalization3 which goes hand in hand with an overall expansion of international law.4
This is certainly the case of the post-WorldWar II trading system. As is well known,
the BrettonWoods agreement included plans for an International TradeOrganization.5
Multilateral trade rules were deemed necessary to tame States’ protectionist and mer-
cantilist instincts which played a significant role in the outbreak of World War II.6
By filling the institutional vacuum left by the failed International Trade Organization,
GATT 1947 introduced some degree of legalization in international trade relations.
Premised on the ‘embedded liberalism’ compromise, these rules granted to contracting
States a margin of maneuvre to intervene in their economies and lessen adjustment
costs.7 Trade liberalization rules were coupled with a number of restraints and the
dispute settlement mechanism ‘was animated by a spirit of political compromise and
discretion, which a more formalized legal machinery might discourage’.8 In the end,
this flexible approach to the liberalization of trade in goods was in turn congenial to
3 Legalization, however, is a dynamic concept. Its intensity may vary according to the ‘bindingness’ and the
precision of the rules and the extent of power delegated by States to supranational authorities, including
jurisdictional bodies. Deeper legalization generally results in the imposition of more pervasive constraints on
states. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, AndrewMoravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan
Snidal, ‘The Concept of Legalization’, 54 (3) International Organization 401 (2000), at 402–404.
4 Tullio Treves, ‘The Expansion of International Law’, 398 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit Interna-
tional (2015), at 219–261.
5 Richard Toye, ‘The International Trade Organization’, in Amrita Narlikar, Martin Daunton, Robert M. Stern
(eds), The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization (Oxford-New York: OUP, 2012) 91.
6 Robert E. Hudec,The GATT Legal System andWorld Trade Diplomacy (Salem: Butterworth Legal Publishers,
1990) 5; Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London: Pimlico, 2007) 108.
7 John Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Eco-
nomic Order’ 36 International Organization 379 (1982), at 412; Andrew Lang, World Trade Law after
Neoliberalism (Oxford-New York: OUP, 2011) 195. The concept of ‘embedded liberalism’ is revived and
reinterpreted by Professor Petersmann in his contribution to this Issue, ‘Economic disintegration? Political,
Economic, and Legal Drivers and the Need for Greening Embedded Trade Liberalism’.
8 Lang, above n 7, at 200; see also Robert E., Hudec, ‘The GATT Legal System: ADiplomat’s Jurisprudence’, 4
(5) Journal ofWorld Trade Law 615 (1970), at 665; JosephH.H.Weiler, ‘The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos
of Diplomacy’, 35 (2) Journal of World Trade (2001), at 192.
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the pursuit of Keynesian’ objectives, such as full employment and the rising of living
standards at the domestic level.9
With the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1994, however, the
pendulumdistinctly swung towardgreater legalization and integration.10 Tobeginwith,
theWTO agreements have a wider scope thanGATT 1947. Consequently, contracting
States are subject to trade disciplines in a wider range of fields, including trade in ser-
vices, agriculture, and intellectual property rights. Another salient novelty introduced
by the WTO was the institutional transformation of the dispute settlement system.11
This differed from its predecessor in that it introduced, amongst others, compulsory
adjudication, binding decisions adopted with the reverse consensus mechanism, and
a system of appellate review.12 The new institutional architecture, though with some
difficulty, brought about a change in the attitude of the various players involved in the
interpretation and application of international trade rules.13 It has been noted that the
WTO legal systemwas in ‘line with the values associated with this new way of thinking
about law: namely, the values of neutrality and objectivity, precision, effectiveness and
strict enforceability, rapidity, expertise, and professionalism’.14
In the same period, the international law on the protection of foreign investment
followed a similar pattern toward greater integration. For one thing, the number of
bilateral investment treaties dramatically increased starting from 1989.15 To appreciate
the magnitude of this increase, it is worth noting that in the period 1959–1989 some
385 bilateral investment treaties were concluded, whilst within the decade from 1989
to1999 that figure more than quadrupled. The number of investment treaties further
climbed in the next decades and today amounts to around 3000 treaties. But that
pace has not been matched since. Furthermore, the 90s were also marked by the
conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Energy Charter
Treaty, two multilateral trade agreements including specific chapters on investment.
Interestingly, the rise in the number of such treaties coincidedwith the reinvigoration of
the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system,whichhad remaineddormant until
then. Investment arbitration clauses gained a central role in the protection of foreign
investment owing to the emergenceof the ‘arbitrationwithout privity’ doctrine.Thanks
to this legal device, arbitral tribunals, even in the absence of a manifestation of State’s
consent to submit to arbitration a specific dispute, could establish their jurisdiction by
9 Emmanuelle Tourme-Jouannet, Le droit international libéral-providence: une histoire du droit international
(Brussels: Bruylant, 2011) 287.
10 Arie Reich, ‘FromDiplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade Relations’, 17Northwestern
Journal of Int’l Law & Bus 775 (1996–1997), at 776.
11 Lang, above n 7, at 245.
12 Weiler, above n 8, at 200.
13 Ibid., at 197–199.
14 Lang, above n 7, at 245. Joost Pauwelyn has argued that the increasing legalization prompted a bidirec-
tional interaction between law and politics. See Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Transformation of World Trade’, 104
Michigan Law Review 1 (2005), at 24–29.
15 UNCTAD, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959–1999’ (United Nations, New York, 2000) 15, https://uncta
d.org/en/Docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf .
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relyingon thedispute settlement provisions contained inbilateral investment treaties.16
Consequently, a wide range of host States’ regulatory measures became exposed to
foreign investors challenges.17
Last, but not least, as the20th centurywasdrawing to a close, theproject ofEuropean
integration—which is in many respects the most advanced experiment of international
economic integration and as such an emblematic case study—also underwent a signif-
icant acceleration.18 Although the European Court of Justice had already made clear
that the EEC/EC constituted a ‘new legal order of international law’19, the European
construct had long qualified as an incomplete ‘custom union plus’.20
However, the 1985CommissionWhite Paper catalyzedmomentum for the relaunch
of the European project.21 Three major and interconnected developments lie at the
heart of this transformation. First, the free movement of capital was brought into line
with the other fundamental freedoms22 through adoptionof the directive 88/361/EEC
and the subsequent amendment of the relevant primary EU law provisions.23 Second,
the creation of the EU citizenship and the Schengen agreement revitalized the free
movement of persons within the Community. Last, with the establishment of the
European Monetary Union, the EC/EU acquired exclusive competence over a matter
that had been traditionally regarded as one of the hallmarks of State sovereignty.
Taken together, these developments ushered in a new phase in international eco-
nomic relations. The post-war international economic order, premised on shallow
economic integration and far-reaching State intervention in socioeconomic affairs,
was transfigured by the advent of what has been defined ‘hyperglobalization’.24 In a
manner that is somewhat reminiscent of the pre-World War II international economic
16 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in International Law on Foreign Investment (Cam-
bridge: CUP, 2015) 136–137. The first arbitral decision to espouse this doctrine wasAAPL v. Sri Lanka. See
Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, 27 June
1990.Thephrase ‘arbitrationwithout privity’ was later coinedby JanPaulsonn. See JanPaulsson, ‘Arbitration
without Privity’, 10 (2) ICSID Review 232 (1995), at 232.
17 Markus Wagner, ‘Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law’, 36
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1 (2014), at 11.
18 Giandomenico Majone, Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-crisis—Has Integration Gone Too Far? (Cam-
bridge: CUP, 2014) 91. It has been argued that this shift towards stronger integration sinks its ideological
roots in the emergenceof a ‘neoliberal consensus’ at the endof the 70s. SeeEdmondoMostacci, ‘Integrazione
attraverso il Mercato e Declino dello Stato Democratico: appunti per un’indagine genealogica’, 42 Diritto
Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo online 371 (2020), at 388–389.
19 Case 26/62, van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administrationen (1963), ECR 3.
20 Jacques Pelkams, ‘The Institutional Economics of European Integration’, in Mauro Cappelleti, Monica
Seccombe, Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds), Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience
(New York: W. de Gruyter, 1986) 354. See for a taxonomy of models of international economic integration
Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962) 2.
21 European Commission, ‘Completing the Internal Market’, White Paper from the Commission to the
European Council, COM(85) 310 Final.
22 The free movement of capital had been until then the least developed of the five EU fundamental freedoms.
See Jukka Snell, ‘FreeMovement of Capital: as a Non-linear Process’, in Paul Craig, GrainneDe Burca (eds),
The Evolution of EU law (Oxford-New York: OUP, 2011) 551.
23 Article 73a of the Treaty of Maastricht, OJ C 191.
24 Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox (New York-London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011) 187–190;
Dani Rodrik, ‘Globalization’s Wrong Turn: And How It Hurt America’, 98 (4) Foreign Affairs 26 (2019),
at 28. Fredric Jameson has read this new phase as ‘the other side or face of that immense movement of
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jiel/article/23/2/299/5871454 by Erasm
us U
niversity R
otterdam
 user on 23 Septem
ber 2020
304 • The Remains of the Day
arrangements,25 this new configuration of the international economic system impinged
more powerfully on the States’ autonomy and powers and went hand in hand with a
huge concentration of wealth in few hands.26
The shift to ‘hyperglobalization’ is neither accidental nor abrupt. After being revived
by a groupof influential intellectuals, neoclassical economics principles gainedmomen-
tum in large number of western States.27 As the neoliberal consensus emerged, every-
where in theworld thepost-WarKeynesian recipeswere gradually ditched.The collapse
of the Soviet Union was the last nail in the coffin. The breakdown of the first and most
powerful socialist State was then regarded as the incontrovertible proof that there was
no viable alternative to liberal democracy and capitalistic market economy.28
The new set of arrangements made—both for its critics and its advocates—the
comparison between supranational economic rules and constitutional law even more
plausible and attractive. The constitutional character of the EEC/EC/EU emerged as
a result of the European Court of Justice’s activism.29 And the later expansion of its
competences and powers has only strengthened the case for this parallel. International
trade rules have also been described as part of a ‘trade constitution,’ which, along with
domestic legislative andconstitutional provisions, ‘imposesdifferent levels of constraint
on the policy options available to public and private leaders’.30 Likewise, investment
protection standards have been likened to obligations in that theywould tie the hands of
the host State and shield the host State’s economic policy frommajoritarian politics.31
The general shift toward integration and legalization, or even ‘constitutionalization,’
in all these contexts has been justified on following grounds. First, international eco-
nomic integration, in its various forms, has been traditionally considered as a driver
decolonization and liberation which took place all over the world in the 1960s’. See Fredric Jameson, ‘The
Aesthetics of Singularity’, 92 New Left Review 101 (2015) at 129.
25 Rodrik, above n 24, at 27.
26 Thomas Piketty, Capital et Idéologie (Paris: Le Seuil, 2019) 553–556.
27 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 19–22.
28 Francis Fukuyama,The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992) 42.
29 JosephH.H.Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ 100 (8) Yale Law Journal 2405 (1991), at 2413–2417.
For a critical account of the process of EU constitutionalization see Marco Dani and Agustín J. Menéndez,
‘É ancora possible riconciliare costituzionalismo democratico-sociale e integrazione europea?’ 1 Diritto
Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo Online 289 (2020). The authors point out that the constitutionalization
discourse in the EU context does not describe the set of democratic and social constitutional guarantees that
are typical of national constitutions. It is in fact a muchmore ambiguous process, which ultimately conceals
the neoliberal turn of the EU, at 309–321.
30 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1997) 339–340. See also, Hannes L. Schloemann and Stefan Ohlhoff, ‘Constitution-
alization’ and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence’, 93(2)
American Journal of International Law 424 (1999), at 424. Some commentators, however, criticized the
‘constitutionalization’ ofworld trade law. SeeRobertHowse andKalypsoNicolaides, ‘Legitimacy andGlobal
Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too far’, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauvé, Arvind
Subramanian, Americo B. Zampetti (eds), Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System
at theMillennium (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) 227; JosephH.H.Weiler, ‘Epilogue:
Towards aCommonLawof InternationalTrade’, in JosephH.H.Weiler (ed),TheEU, theWTOand theNafta.
Towards a Common Law of International Trade (Oxford-New York: OUP, 2001) 230.
31 David Schneidermann,Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules andDemocracy’s Promise
(Cambridge: CUP, 2008) 37–39.
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of economic growth—a ‘golden straitjacket’.32 The removal of barriers to trade in
goods and services and factormobility would drive their prices down to ‘the irreducible
minima arising from spatial differentiation’.33 This would in turn unleash economies of
scale, fiercer competition, ensure amore efficient allocationof resources and, ultimately,
enhance productivity.
Second, strengthening the economic interdependence between States has been con-
sidered as an indispensable instrument to durably establish peaceful relations between
them.34 States trading with each other are less prone to resort to force in case of
disagreement between them. Peace through trade, as the phrase goes!
Third, the combination of deep economic integration and widespread legalization
of international economic relations reconciles the public sphere (the world of States or
‘imperium’) with the private one (the world of property or ‘dominium’).35 The world
of property is ‘encased’ and thus shielded from undue interferences from the world of
States.36
There is little doubt that purging the economic sphere from political interferences
and perturbations favors international economic transactions. Yet, depoliticizing rules
and procedures does not entail the obliteration of the political relevance of these
matters. Thus, politics thrownout of the door cameback through thewindow. In fact, as
the power and competences of supranational economic institutions grew to include, e.g.
health, intellectual property, andfinance, sodid thenumberof interferenceswith former
purely internal matters as well as the number of stakeholders potentially affected by
them.When it comes to economic matters, the domaine réservé of the States is virtually
non-existent in the era of ‘hyperglobalization’.
The 2007–2008 economic and financial meltdown, however, marked a breaking
point after three decades of relentless expansion of the market system.37 The trust in
the free market system and, consequently, in the so-called neoliberal international eco-
nomic order reached its nadir.38 It became apparent that the functioning of the market
mechanism was gripped by ‘internal’,39 namely the unequal distribution of wealth and
income, and ‘external’ limits, i.e. the limitedness of natural resources and the degrad-
ability of the natural environment.40 The feeling that these rules and institutions were
at least inadequate to address the daunting distributive and environmental challenges
linked to the cross-border flow of goods, services, and capital became widespread. As
the gold of the straitjacket turned into rust for many, the constraints stemming from
32 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: McMillan, 2000) 102–103.
33 Pelkmans, above n 20, at 319.
34 See Jacob Viner, Essays on the Intellectual History of Economics (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1991)
42.
35 Quinn Slobodian,Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Harvard: Harvard University
Press, 2018) 10.
36 Ibid., at 24.
37 AdamTooze,Crashed:How aDecade of Financial Crises Changed theWorld (NewYork: Viking, 2018) 81–84,
139–140.
38 Paul De Grauwe, The Limits of the Market: The Pendulum Between Government and Market (Oxford: OUP,
2017), 144.
39 Ibid., at 40–52.
40 Ibid., at 20–38.
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supranational economic rules unsurprisingly came under fire. That is not to say that
these institutions had been immune to criticism until then.
Critical legal thinking even in theheydays of ‘hyperglobalization’ described the inter-
national economic order as an imperialist construct serving the interests of powerful
Western States and of transnational corporations headquartered in their territories.41
Another stream of literature, instead, focused on the shaky democratic legitimacy of
supranational economic institutions.42 Outside of academic circles, the so-called anti-
or alter-globalization movement voiced the discontent of the ‘losers’ of globalization
in the streets of the cities hostingWTOMinisterial Conferences, G8 meetings and the
World Economic Forum.
Yet, in the post-crisis context, the limits of the ‘hyperglobalized’ international eco-
nomic order manifested themselves more clearly and widely.
II. THEPOLYMORPHISMOFDISINTEGRATION: ANANALYTICAL
APPROACHAND ITSRAMIFICATION
In literal terms, disintegration refers to the phenomenon of being destroyed or breaking
up into smaller parts; it implies ‘loss of unity and integrity’.43 While it might appear
quite trivial, this definition is at the heart of our research endeavor. Our aim is to
understand what lies behind these dynamics of disintegration and explore possible
correlation patterns with the ‘integrationist’ architecture of the current international
economic order. This means that we do not start by assigning a normative value to
‘disintegrating’ phenomena, we do not take a stance as to whether these are desirable
or not. However, we do engage in our conclusions with the normative question of what
is the way forward.
As already mentioned above, these disintegrating tendencies seem to materialize
both as disintegration of law and disintegration through44 law: the first referring to
the visible crisis of the regimes of international economic law; the second indicating
the downgrade of socio-economic and environmental systems purportedly brought
about by these regimes. At this point, two caveats are in order. First, from a scoping
perspective, when discussing disintegration of law, we do not use it as a synonym
for ‘fragmentation’. In fact, our understanding is broader, in that it goes beyond the
41 See, amongst others, B.S. Chimni, ‘International InstitutionsToday: An Imperial Global State in theMaking’
15 (1) European Journal of International Law 1 (2004), at 4–6; See alsoMichael Hardt and Antonio Negri,
Empire (Harvard,MA:HarvardUniversity Press, 2000);Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah,The International
Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
42 Eric Stein, ‘International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight’ 95 (3) American Journal of
International law 489 (2001), at 489–492; Markus Krajewski, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional
Perspectives of WTO Law’ 35 (1) Journal of World Trade 165 (2001), at 175–177; Andreas Follesdal and
Simon Hix, ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’ 44(3)
Journal of CommonMarket Studies 533 (2006), at 551–554.
43 Cambridge Learner’s Dictionary (Cambridge: CUP, 2008).
44 We borrow this phrase from Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘Disintegration Through Law’, 1(1) European Papers 3
(2016). However, the author employs this phrase to indicate only disintegration of law through law. We
expand it to include disintegration of socio-economic and environmental systems through law.
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multiplication of ‘self-contained’ regimes and the conflictual relations among them.45
We are interested in general attitudes of disengagement46 from—and erosion of—
economic integration regimes and the efforts of States to recalibrate these rules. The
second caveat is that we do not consider these two tendencies as separate, but rather
as iterative. In this sense, one might say that disintegration of law is a reaction to
domestic social and environmental disruption generated by deep economic integration
(disintegration through law).47
A. Disintegration through law
It has been cogently argued that deep economic integration has rewritten the relation-
ship between the nation-state and international economic institutions.48 The current
architecture has articulated a specific model of economic governance horizontally
(among States), but also vertically (within States). And it has done so by insulating and
constraining domestic decision-making space—creating a sort of ‘empty shell’ effect.
This inevitably altered domestic socio-economic relations, with a profounddistributive
impact.49
Indeed, it is now commonplace that the opening-up of domestic economies to for-
eign products and production factors creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Global value chains
(GVCs), the backbone of the world trading system, have produced large efficiency
gains and increased integration of trade, while spreading production processes over the
globe.50 The incontestable benefits stemming from this way of organizing production
have long concealed its main weaknesses. Contravening the fundamental promise of
prosperity and abundance undergirding international trade, GVCs did not prove to
45 See amongst others Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search
for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ 25Michigan Journal of International Law 999 (2004);
Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski ‘Of Planets and Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’
17(3) European Journal of International Law 483 (2006).
46 James Crawford, ‘The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law’, 81(1) Modern Law
Review 1 (2018); Martina Buscemi and Loris Mariotti ‘Obblighi procedurali e conseguenze del recesso dai
trattati: quale rilevanza della convenzione di Vienna nella prassi recente?‘4 Rivista di diritto internazionale
939 (2019).
47 The role of law as co-constitutive or at least as an enabler of certain phenomena, be they socio-economic
or natural, has been developed at length in international economic law literature. Just recently, Katharina
Pistor, The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2019); Anne Orford, ‘International law and the social question’, Annual T.M.C. Asser Lecture 2019,
28 November 2019. A summary of the main arguments articulated during the lecture can be found at
Taylor Woodcock, Antoine Duval and Dimitri Van Den Meerssche, ‘“I Want to Put the Social Question
Back on the Table”—An Interviewwith AnneOrford’, Opinio Juris, 27November 2019, http://opiniojuris.
org/2019/11/27/i-want-to-put-the-social-question-back-on-the-table-an-interview-with-anne-orford/.
48 Ext. Rodrik above n 24, Gregory Shaffer, ‘Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion’, 2019University
of Illinois Law Review 1 (2019).
49 Gregory Shaffer, ‘How Do We Get Along? International Economic Law and the Nation-State’, 117(1)
Michigan Law Review 1229 (2019). Admittedly, States were not simply bystanders in this process. Their
consent has been the bedrock upon which the complex international economic order has been built. Yet,
this does not obliterate the imbalances characterizing the international community. By piercing the cloak
of formalism surrounding international relations, one would come to the realization that a large number of
States have often been rule-takers.
50 Robert C. Feenstra, ‘Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy’, 12 (4)
Journal of Economic Perspectives 31 (1998).
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be resilient enough to avert shortage in medical appliances and personal protection
equipment amid the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.51 More importantly, they
presuppose, as the pro-trade narrative generally does, the prevalence of consumer
welfare over the well-being of those who produce the goods.52 In this respect, it has
been aptly pointed out that while free-trade benefits are ‘widespread and small for each
individual, making them almost invisible to most people,’ its losses ‘are concentrated,
are highly visible, and hit well-defined groups’.53 For large sections of national societies,
especially in developed countries, the competitive pressures unleashed by trade liber-
alization, if anything, have not only resulted in job losses but also in the uprooting of
well-established collective identities.54 Against this backdrop, States, not least because
of their reduced fiscal capacity, have often failed to provide adequate compensation
measures.55 It is thus no surprise that, disgruntled and disenfranchised, ‘producers’
came back with a vengeance, which has shaken domestic social structures. In this
respect, it has been persuasively shown that there is a strong correlation between import
competition and the rise of nationalism and anti-immigration sentiments across the
world.56 Furthermore, anti-immigration policies, according to the analysis of Margaret
Peters in this Issue,57 have also gained support from businesses, especially in developed
countries. In her view, this can be regarded as a side-effect of the lower demand for
low-skill labor, which has decreased ensuing from the relocation of manufacturing
activities toward developing countries. More widely, the combination of these factors
has laid the groundwork for the (re)appearanceof a ‘Schmitteanmoment,’ asAlessandra
Arcuri christened it in her contribution.58 An(unqualified) ‘return’ to thenation-state is
often depicted as the way to fix distributive problems and democratic deficits. However
plausible it may seem, this view disregards that national sovereignty is not necessarily
51 The topic has now been extensively discussed in various online fora, see among others Anthea
Roberts and Nicolas Lamp ‘Is the Virus Killing Globalization? There’s No One Answer’, Barron’s, 15
March 2020, https://www.barrons.com/articles/is-the-virus-killing-globalization-theres-no-one-answe
r-51584209741; Tom Linton and Bindiya Vakil, ‘Coronavirus Is Proving We Need More Resilient Supply
Chains’, Harvard Business Review, 5 March 2020, https://hbr.org/2020/03/coronavirus-is-proving-that-
we-need-more-resilient-supply-chains.
52 Alan S. Blinder, ‘Free Trade Paradox. The Bad Politics of a Good Idea’ 98 Foreign Affairs 119 (2018), at 125.
53 Ibid.
54 Pierre Bourdieu defines neoliberalism as a ‘methodical destruction of collectives’, in ‘The Essence of
Neoliberalism’, Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1998, https://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu.
Karl Polanyi had alreadywarned of the risks of dis-embedding economic activities from societyKarl Polanyi,
The Great Transformation (New York: Farrar & Rinehart 1944).
55 Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics
1997) 54. See also Shaffer, above n 49, at 1233. According to the latter, while domestic distributive and
social adjustments to (deeper) economic integration are called for, ‘it [an “unqualified” support for trade
agreements] fails to address how economic globalization implicates domestic politics and social relations,
which affects states’ ability and willingness to do so’. For a critical analysis of the U.S. Trade Adjustment
Assistance, see Edward Alden, Failure to Adjust: How Americans Got Left Behind in the Global Economy
(Lanhan: Rownman & Littlefiled) 107–126.
56 Italo Colantone and Pietro Stanig, ‘The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and
Voting Behavior inWestern Europe’, 62(4) American Journal of Political Science 936 (2018), at 937–939.
57 Margaret Peters, ‘Integration and Disintegration: Trade and Labor Market Integration’, in this Issue.
58 Alessandra Arcuri, ‘International Economic Law and Disintegration: Beware the Schmittean Moment’, in
this Issue.
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a site of democracy and redistribution, as the recent surge of authoritarianism and
executive ‘power-grab’ during the Covid-19 pandemic have shown quite well. Besides
the disintegration of domestic socio-economic structures, disintegration through law
suitably describes the relationship between international economic rules andStates’ ter-
ritories. Notably, the combined effect of the substantive content of certain investment
contract arrangements between host States and investors, and the ‘internationalized’
protection of investors’ rights via International Investment Agreements (IIAs) and
ISDS enables the creation of ‘legal enclaves’.59 Investors gain extensive control over
investment areas, which are removed from the territorial authority of the host country.
Typically, such an enclave is deprivedof the host State’s regulatory powers and left to the
discretion of the investors, producing ‘structural holes in the tissue of national sovereign
territory,’60 and ultimately disarticulating territory from its normativemeaning. Yet, the
creation of a ‘territorially circumscribed state of exception’ has been often regarded as
a precondition for the commodification and marketization of such resources.61 This
legal construct is instrumental for these resources to enter GVCs. With this in mind,
one cannot but agree with the view expressed by Lorenzo Cotula in his contribution
to this Issue,62 that in this domain ‘debates about integration and dis-integration are
a function of perspective and positionality’. Put another way, the commodification of
natural resources—via investment related governance—achieves an integration that is
only partial and limited to sub-national areas where commercial value is concentrated,
which in turn disintegrates social and legal regimes at the local level.
This is connected to the ‘material’ disintegration of territory, which can be under-
stood as the irreversible deterioration of the natural environment and its ecosystems.
That human economic activities produce a negative impact on the environment, rang-
ing from rampant CO2 emissions, to pollution of air and water, is now undisputed.
That international (economic) arrangements have played a part—at least to a certain
extent—in this process is highly probable. Interestingly, the beginning of the ‘great
acceleration’, the period when the imprint of human activity on the environment
intensified dramatically, coincided with the emergence of the post-war international
economic order.63
59 Alessandra Arcuri and Federica Violi, ‘Reconfiguring Territoriality in International Economic Law’, 47
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 175 (2017), at 199.
60 Saskia Sassen, ‘Land Grabs Today: Feeding the disassembly’, 10(1) Globalizations 25 (2013), at 26.
61 On this point see also Lorenzo Cotula, ‘The State of Exception and the Law of the Global Economy: A
Conceptual and Empirico-Legal Inquiry’, 8(4) Transnational Legal Theory 424 (2017).
62 Lorenzo Cotula, ‘(Dis)integration in Global Resource Governance: Extractivism, Human Rights and
Investment Treaties’, in this Issue.
63 Will Steffen, Jacques Grinevald, Paul Crutzen and John Mcneill, ‘The Anthropocene: Conceptual and
Historical Perspectives’ 369 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society (2011), at 842. As highlighted
by the authors, rather than designating a uniform economic growth increase, the ‘Great Acceleration’ marks
a qualitative change in the organization of consumption and production, and ultimately in the organization
of economic relations, at 851–853. See also Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, L’Événement
Anthropocène, (Paris: Seuil, 2016) 269; Ellen Hey, ‘International Law and the Anthropocene’, 5(10) ESIL
Reflections (2016), https://esil-sedi.eu/esil-reflection-international-law-and-the-anthropocene-2/; Jorge
E. Viñuales, ‘Law and the Anthropocene’ C-EENRGWorking Paper 2016–5 (2016), at 29.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jiel/article/23/2/299/5871454 by Erasm
us U
niversity R
otterdam
 user on 23 Septem
ber 2020
310 • The Remains of the Day
At any rate, international economic law is one of the fields where the profound
disconnect64 betweenhumans and their environmenthasmore visibly emerged.Nature
is perceived as ‘external’ and ‘other’ fromhumankind.Accordingly, nature is a resource65
that can be ‘owned,’ controlled and accumulated by an owner or a sovereign. Con-
sequently, degradation and overexploitation deriving from commercial transactions
are addressed as externalities. This is to a certain extent due to the fact that neither
environmental protection nor global warming were on the radar of the international
community until the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.66 International economic law, in other
words, ‘organizes production processes both domestically and internationally’67 first,
to only address at a second stage ‘external’ shocks disturbing the pre-established system,
without in fact intervening at the source of the problem. This disconnect and its
implications are visible at several levels.
Trade and investment rules are a case in point. Traditionally, both regimes treat
environmental protection as an exception (at best). As is well known, old generation
IIAs did not include any specific safeguard for the environment.68 This pattern has
progressively changed in the last years, with the inclusion of explicit exceptions in
64 Extensively tracing this disconnect in historiography, social sciences, and law, Viñuales above n 63. To see
how this has played out in the spreading of Covid 19 see Ntina Tzouvala, ‘COVID-19 Symposium: The
Combined and Uneven Geography of COVID-19, or on Law, Capitalism and Disease’, Opinio Juris, 2
April 2020, http://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/02/covid-19-symposium-the-combined-and-uneven-geogra
phy-of-covid-19-or-on-law-capitalism-and-disease/ and Leslie-Anne Duvic Pauli, ‘COVID-19 Sympo-
sium:TheCOVID-19Pandemic and theLimits of International Environmental Law’,Opinio Juris, 30March
2020, http://opiniojuris.org/2020/03/30/covid-19-symposium-the-covid-19-pandemic-and-the-limits-
of-international-environmental-law/.
65 Such conceptual underpinning—nature as something to be ‘owned’ and controlled, that is—is deeply
engrained in the modern and contemporary notions of both sovereignty and property, and intimately
linked to the commodification (and accumulation) of natural resources and the fully-fledged incorporation
thereof in GVCs. Extensively, for an excellent analysis of this understanding of nature and its foundation in
state of nature, see Tom Sparks ‘The Place of the Environment in State of Nature Discourses: Reassessing
Nature, Property and Sovereignty in the Anthropocene’, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law
& International Law (MPIL) Research Paper No. 2020–10 (2020).
66 Contra Bonneuil and Fressoz above n 63, according to whom this awareness predates, at 95–96.
67 Jorge E. Viñuales, ‘TheOrganisation of the Anthropocene: InOurHands?’ 1(1) International Legal Theory
and Practice, 1 (2018), at 44. The author adds: ‘We have lost sight of how idiosyncratic and culturally-
situated the growth and efficiency-based legal organisation of society and its relations with nature are’, at
28. This disconnect is also related to the neoclassical notion of economic (monetary) value as a foundation
of ‘equal exchange,’ which hides severe instances of asymmetry in wealth flux and uneven distribution of
resources, and further contributes to environmental degradation. This aspect has been lucidly captured by
the ideaof ‘unequal exchange’ and ‘emergy’. Ecologically speaking, ‘unequal exchange’ indicates that the same
monetary value of goods produced in theNorth against goods produced in the South implies a very different
ecological footprint, with the latter goods utilizing much more (labor), energy and resources for the same
amount of money. Structurally, this also depends on differences in the economic organization of countries,
with global South countries relyingheavily onextractive industries. SeeViñuales aboven63, at 30. For amore
recent discussion Oliver Schlaudt ‘The Market as a ‘Rigged Game’? Economic Value and the Challenge of
Ecologically Unequal Exchange’ Verfassungsblog, 4March 2020, https://verfassungsblog.de/the-market-a
s-a-%ca%bbrigged-game%ca%bc-economic-value-and-the-challenge-of-ecologically-unequal-exchange/.
68 In the absence of a clear textual indication, arbitral tribunals have adopted a variety of approaches in
dealing with environment related investment disputes. E.g. Metalclad Corp. v Mexico, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 30 August 2000; Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL,
Final Award on Jurisdiction andMerits, 3 August 2005 andmore recentlyBurlington Resources Inc. v Republic
of Ecuador ICSID ARB 08/05, Decision on Ecuador’s counterclaims, 7 February 2017.
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the treaty text. As to the WTO, the Appellate Body, has built a consistent body of
jurisprudence relying on GATT Article XX lett. (b) and (g),69 that often strays from
the script contained in theWTOAgreements.70 Yet, theWTO-compatibility of a large
number of climate change policies is still dubious, particularly vis-à-vis the subsidies
disciplines.71 And the notorious Appellate Body decision inCanada-renewable energy72
also failed to dispel such doubts.73 In fact, it shows the inadequacy of those rules more
than anything else.74According to Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann in his contribution, while
treaty reform is desirable in the long term, addressing the issue is undelayable. To this
purpose, in his view, treaty reform is not necessary in the short term. A new and greener
version of ‘embedded liberalism’ compromise can be established, amongst others, ‘[B]y
interpreting anddeveloping theWTOsustainabledevelopmentobjective in conformity
with the universally agreed 17 SDGs and the Paris Agreement on climate change’.75
Recent international treaty practice has seemingly devoted more attention to environ-
mental concerns, moving beyond the traditional approach.Mega-regionals, like CETA,
USMCA, and TPP, do include environmental content, typically in separate chapters.
However, the regime they devise does not fully integrate environmental objectives with
trade liberalization commitments. These agreements mostly leave the achievement of
these objectives to rather softer cooperation and best efforts, or to obligations that are
hardly enforceable, albeit with few notable exceptions.76
69 See Francesco Francioni, ‘Environment,HumanRights and the Limits of FreeTrade’, in Francesco Francioni
(ed), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford-Portland: Hart Publishing, 2001) 8–17.
See also Steve Charnovitz, ‘Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX’, 25 Journal of
World Trade 37 (1991), at 38–47.
70 Robert Howse, ‘The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary’, 27(1)
European Journal of International Law 9 (2016), at 36. See for a different and less rosy take on this matter
Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The WTO 20 Years On: “Global Governance by Judiciary” or, Rather, Member-driven
Settlement of (Some) Trade Disputes between (Some) WTO Members?’ 27 (4) European Journal of
International Law 1119 (2017), at 1121–1127.
71 See, amongst others, Bradly J. Condon and Tapen Sinha, The Role of Climate Change in Global Economic
Governance (Oxford: OUP, 2013) 53–65.
72 WTOAppellateBodyReport,Canada—CertainMeasuresAffecting theRenewableEnergyGenerationSector—
WT/DS412/AB/RWT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24May 2013, para 5.178.
73 AaronCosbey andPetrosMavroidis, ‘ATurquoiseMess:Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy andRenew-
able Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’, 17 Journal of International
Economic Law 11 (2014), at 26–29.
74 For a detailed reform plan, see Ibid., at 42–46.
75 Petersmann, above n 7.
76 The most notable and stringent one being the prohibition of subsidies for fishing overfished stocks in both
TPP (Art. 20.16.5 (a) and (b)) and USMCA (Art. 24.20.1). The issue is on the negotiating agenda of the
WTO as well. As to the environmental chapters, it is interesting to note that, contrary to USMCA and TPP,
the Trade and Sustainable Chapter (22) and Trade and Environment Chapter (24) of CETA are not subject
to the State-to-State dispute settlement mechanism provided by the treaty. Furthermore, environmental
measures are admittedly still subject to the GATT XX-like exception under Art. 28.3. See on this Sophia
Paulini, ‘Robust, Comprehensive and Binding?—A Critical Analysis of the Substantive Environmental
Provisions in the Chapters on Trade and Sustainable Development of EU FTAs’, in Federico Casolari
and Lucia S. Rossi (eds), Integrating FTAs into the EU Legal Order: Threatening or Mainstreaming the EU
Constitutional Identity? (Edward Elgar, forthcoming) (on file with the author); Phillip Paiement, ‘Leveraging
Trade Agreements for Labor LawEnforcement: Drawing Lessons from theUS-Guatemala CAFTADispute’
49Georgetown Journal of International Law 675 (2018). A recent Franco-Dutch proposal attempts to strike
a better balance between trade and environment in FTAs negotiated and concluded by the EU. At a first
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Just as international economic law relegates environmental protection mainly to
exceptions, international environmental law adopts market-based mechanisms and
incentives to tackle climate change and ‘internalize’ externalities, de facto maintaining
and reproducing the same disconnect. Multilateral environmental agreements have
introduced a varied set of such incentives, such as the carbon credit system or the
REDD+ mechanism to ‘protect’ forests. Climate change market and financial mech-
anisms have generally proved to be inefficient,77 a perverse incentive to pollute more,
especially in developing countries,78 and generally ignore problems of distribution of
power and resources.79
B. Disintegration of law
Next to disintegration through law, one can also discern a widespread disintegration of
the existing international economic regimes. It iswell-known that both the international
trade and investment regimes are facing awidely documented backlash. The disintegra-
tionof the legal infrastructurematerializes in a variety ofmanners, spanning theoutright
withdrawal from international treaties and less intense forms of disengagement and
‘delegalization’.80 For this reason,we adopt here a broadunderstandingof disintegration
of law.
Given its magnitude and the variety of its manifestations, this phenomenon is
potentially explainable by resorting to a wide array of factors, including contingent
and sector-specific ones. To be sure, geopolitical and geo-economic81 ‘seismic shifts’
glance, it seems that the proposal makes trade liberalization commitments dependent upon the respect of
sustainability obligations. JimBrunsden andVictorMallet ‘France andNetherlands call for tougher EU trade
conditions’, Financial Times, 4May 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/e14f082c-42e1-4bd8-ad68-54714
b995dff.
77 See amongst others the failure of the EU Emission Trading System, which determined (at least at the
beginning) a surplus of emission allowances, ‘Market Stability’, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/
reform_en; most recently on the risk of the creation of a coal bubble Frédéric Simon, ‘Coal bubble’ Puts
EU Carbon Market Under Threat, Watchdog Warns’, Euractiv, 20 September 2019, https://www.euracti
v.com/section/emissions-trading-scheme/news/fri-ready-coal-bubble-puts-eu-carbon-market-under-
threat-watchdog-warns/; Annalisa Savaresi, ‘Natural Resources Grabbing: The Case of Tropical Forests
andREDD+’, in Francesca Romanin Jacur, Angelica Bonfanti and Francesco Seatzu (eds),Natural Resources
Grabbing: an International Law Perspective (Leiden-Boston: Brill-Martinus Nijhoff 2016), 159–180.
78 Jolene Lin, ‘An Overview of the Clean Development Mechanism in Southeast Asia’, in Kheng-Lian Koh,
Lin Heng and Jolene Lin (eds), Crucial Issues in Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Asia and the World
(Singapore: World Scientific Publishing 2009) 99–126. The author shows how the problem lies in the
production-based accounting of CO2. This creates a pervert incentive for developing countries—which are
bound to less restrictive commitments—to produce more and increase industrial production to export to
the Global North.
79 AtienoMboya, ‘HumanRights and theGlobalClimateChangeRegime’, 58(1)Natural Resources Journal 51
(2018), at 59. See also Stephen Humphreys, ‘Conceiving Justice: Articulating Common Causes in Distinct
Regimes’, in Stephen Humphreys (ed),Human Rights and Climate Change (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 299–
319.There is also growing literature on the effects of ‘green growth’ in terms of social and distributive impact.
SeeDanielW.O’Neill, ‘BeyondGreenGrowth’, 3Nature Sustainability 260 (2020). According to the author
‘green growth’ policies might be counterproductive. A macroeconomic model incorporating distributive
considerations from the outset should instead be preferred.
80 Crawford, above n 46, at 6; Buscemi andMariotti, above n 46, at 944.
81 See Anthea Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes, Victor Ferguson, ‘Toward a Geoeconomic Order in Interna-
tional Trade and Investment’ 22(4) Journal of International Economic Law 655 (2019).
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have always been fraught with consequences for the international economic order.
The move toward a bi- (or tri-) polar world has been partly responsible for triggering
this dynamic. This is in turn broadly reflected in the framing of trade relations in
terms of security related issues,82 but also in the generalized perception of the need to
protect ‘strategic’ or ‘critical’ sectors. States have certainly become graduallymore aware
of vulnerabilities inherent to deeper economic interdependence.83 Yet, as we show
below, this shift is intimately connected to the disintegration through law phenomena
analyzed in section II.A—namely the effects of international economic regimes on
socio-economic structures and the environment—which we argue are to a certain
extent generating the simultaneous deterioration of virtually all international economic
law regimes. To make matters worse, the issue is further complicated by the fact that
States have (perhaps unsurprisingly) reacted on a piecemeal basis, adopting attitudes of
‘disengagement’ consistent with their different understanding of economic integration
and the interests attached to it.84
To begin with, disintegration through law offers a compelling explanation to the dis-
integration of international trade law. As is well-known, theWorld Trade Organization
had shown signs of distress already at the beginning of the newmillennium.85 However,
although the agonizing stalemate of theDoha round cast serious doubts on the prospect
of advancement of the multilateral trading system, the day-to-day functioning of the
WTO was not in peril. But the unthinkable became reality. Disintegration culminated
in theUnitedStates’ obstructing the appointmentofAppellateBodymembers, towhich
the European Union has responded by promoting the establishment of an interim
appeal facility.86 Not to mention the attempt of the US at reading the national security
clause87 to include economic security; and the efforts at bi-lateralizing the relationship
82 Ibid.
83 This realization is for example reflected in the adoption of the EU investment screening guidelines and
most recently the subject of a fervent video of the President of the EU Commission. Communication from
the Commission Guidance to the Member States concerning foreign direct investment and free movement
of capital from third countries, and the protection of Europe’s strategic assets, ahead of the application of
Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation) 2020/C 99 I/01, OJ C 99I. See the video message
of the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen, 25 March 2020, https://www.youtube.com/wa
tch?v=V2zi6UxZoHA.
84 See Petersmann, above n 7. The author identifies three such ‘general attitudes’: hegemonic nationalist
mercantilist à laTrump; totalitarian state-capitalism à laChina; ordo-liberal European constitutionalism.
85 On the WTO crisis cf. ext. the last Special Issue in this journal on ‘Trade Wars’, introduced by Anne van
Aaken,ChadP.BownandAndrewLang, 22(4) Journal of InternationalEconomicLaw(2019). See also Joost
Pauwelyn, ‘WTODispute Settlement Post 2019:What to Expect?’ 22(3) Journal of International Economic
Law, 297 (2019).
86 At present 21 WTO members have endorsed the EU’s initiative. Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration
Arrangement Pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU, 27 March 2020, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2020/march/tradoc_158685.pdf .
87 On the security exception seeGeraldoVidigal ‘WTOAdjudication andThe Security Exception: Something
Old, SomethingNew, SomethingBorrowed—SomethingBlue?’ 46(3)Legal Issues of Economic Integration
203 (2019); Diane Desierto, ‘Protean “National Security” in Global Trade Wars, Investment Walls, and
RegulatoryControls:Can “National Security” EverBeUnreviewable in International EconomicLaw?’, EJIL:
Talk!, 2 April 2018, https://www.ejiltalk.org/national-security-defenses-in-trade-wars-and-investment-
walls-us-v-china-and-eu-v-us/; Viktoriia Lapa, ‘The WTO Panel Report in Russia—Traffic in Transit:
Cutting the Gordian Knot of the GATT Security Exception?’69 QIL, Zoom-in 5 (2020).
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with China.88 While not resulting in a formal withdrawal, these moves are certainly
able to stall the full functioning of the WTO. This dramatic turn, and the whole
Trump trade agenda, can be regarded as a reaction to the inability of WTO disciplines
to prevent China from enacting several measures, such as undervaluing its currency,
setting the price of inputs and so on,89 which gave her a sizeable—and, for many,
unfair—competitive advantage. In sum, it is a response to the so-called ‘China shock,’
namely the colossal post-WTO accession China’s trade expansion, which resulted in
the decimation of manufacturing companies in several industrial districts of the United
States90 and generated the backlash of the disenfranchised ‘losers’ described above.
Proposals to address this crisis are located somewhere within and outside the WTO
system. An example is the proposal advanced by the Minister of Economy, Trade and
Industry of Japan, theUnited StatesTradeRepresentative, theEuropeanCommissioner
for Trade, which constitutes a concerted effort to address this issue.91 Yet, however
legitimate these concerns may be, one wonders whether such unilateral or plurilateral
initiatives risk doingmore harm than good.RobertHowse92 argues in this Issue that the
US-EU-Japan proposal, which further constrains active industrial policy, could not be
untimelier in view of the resurgent role of the State as ‘crisis manager’. More restrictive
rules on subsidies and state enterprises could damage not only China, but also (quite
ironically) their proponents. Howse advances a bilateral solution, which instead leaves
to the States non-discriminatory general domestic policy choices.
Secondly, disintegration through law phenomena might also explain the disintegra-
tion of international investment law, which is currently enduring the full spectrum
of disintegration tendencies. This is certainly sparked by the severe legitimacy crisis
the system has undergone in the last ten years. It would be a repetitious exercise to
elaborate on this backlash, widely documented in the literature,93 which—as is well
known—relates to the constraint that IIAs and ISDS impose on the host State’s right
to regulate and the related impact on human rights and the environment. In their
88 Economic and Trade Agreement between the Government of The United States Of America and the
Government of The People’s Republic Of China, signed on 15 January 2020, https://ustr.gov/sites/defau
lt/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_
The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf .
89 Ibid.
90 Paul Blustein, Schism: China, America and the Fracturing of the Global Trading System (Waterloo: Center for
International Governance Innovation 2019) 27–28.
91 Joint Statement of theTrilateralMeeting of theTradeMinisters of Japan, theUnited States and the European
Union, 14 January 2020, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/janua
ry/joint-statement-trilateral-meeting-trade-ministers-japan-united-states-and-european-union.
92 RobertHowse, ‘Making theWTO(Not So)Great Again: TheCaseAgainst Responding to theTrumpTrade
Agenda Through Reform ofWTORules on Subsidies and State Enterprises’ in this Issue.
93 The literature on the topic is extensive. See amongst others David Schneiderman, ‘International Investment
Law’s Unending Legitimation Project’ 49 Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 229 (2017); Kyla
Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science’, in Chester
Brown and Kate Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge: CUP, 2011);
Sornarajah, above n 16; Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung and Claire Balchin (eds), The
BacklashAgainst InvestmentArbitration. Perceptions andReality (Alphen aandenRijn:WoltersKluwer, 2010).
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contribution, Lorenzo Pellegrini et al.94 provide a disturbing yet exemplary account of
the reasons which triggered this backlash. The insulation of investors’ rights through
a system of substantive and procedural protection is able to create structural barriers
for the attainment of environmental justice, even in contexts of massive environmental
damages and higher-than-normal morbidity and mortality rates.95
It thus comes as no surprise that international investment law has entered a phase
of tumultuous change. On the one hand, States have unilaterally withdrawn from
IIAS96 and denounced the ICSID Convention (albeit more limited in numbers).97
On the other hand, there is currently a plethora of reform proposals concerning both
substantive standards and the ISDS mechanism, some possibly more transformative
than others.98 But the road to change is bumpy and tortuous. For one thing, even formal
withdrawal from IIAs does not necessarily imply a complete disengagement from the
current investment protection regime. Sunset clauses—at times long ones—delay the
full and immediate effects of withdrawals. Furthermore, reforming themassive network
of IIAs inevitably takes time. Finally, States and investors can still agree contractually to
protection terms that do not differ much from the existing IIAs in terms of substance,
and canoffer contract-based arbitration, possiblywithin the same institutional setting as
treaty-based arbitration.99 In this respect, as arguedbyMuthucumaraswamySornarajah
94 Lorenzo Pellegrini, Murat Arsel, Martí Orta-Martínez andCarlos F.Mena, ‘International Investment Agree-
ments,HumanRights andEnvironmental Justice: TheTexaco/ChevronCase from theEcuadorianAmazon’
in this Issue.
95 Ruggie, above n. 7; Andrew Lang, ‘Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Con-
structivist Approaches to the Study of the International Trade Regime’ 9(1) Journal of International
Economic Law 81 (2006); Alexander Ebner, ‘Transnational Markets and the Polanyi Problem’, in Christian
Joerges, Josef Falke (eds), Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets,
(Oxford: Hart 2011) 19.
96 Notable examples include South Africa, India, Bolivia, Venezuela, but also Italy (denunciation of the treaty)
and Russian Federation (termination of provisional application) from the Energy Charter Treaty. See
UNCTAD, Recent developments in the international investment regime: Taking stock of phase 2 reform
actions Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat, UN Doc. TD/B/C.II/42, 2 September 2019; UNCTAD, IIA
Issue Note, Issue 3, June 2019 https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d5_en.pdf .
97 Ibid.
98 Most notably the work of UNCITRAL Working Group III on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform
and the proposals for the amendment of the ICSID Rules. On these proposals see a.o. Jane Kelsey, Gus
Van Harten and David Schneiderman, ‘Phase 2 of the UNCITRAL ISDS Review: Why “Other Mat-
ters” Really Matter’ in Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper, 2019 papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a
bstract_id=3329332; Malcolm Langford, Anthea Roberts, ‘UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Hastening
slowly’, EJIL:Talk!, 29 April 2019, https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-hastening-slowly/;
Anthea Roberts, Taylor St. John, ‘UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: Visualizing a Flexible Framework’,
EJIL: Talk!, 24 October 2019, https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reform-visualising-a-flexible-fra
mework/; Alessandra Arcuri and Francesco Montanaro, ‘Justice for All? Protecting the Public Interest in
Investment Treaties’ 59 Boston College Law Review 2791 (2018); Alessandra Arcuri and Federica Violi
‘Reimaging ISDS: fromUNCITRALWGIII to the Europeanway andwhywe aremissing out on sustainabil-
ity’ 13(3) Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale 579 (2019); Daria Davitti, Jean Ho, Paolo Vargiu and Anil
Yilmaz Vastardis, ‘COVID-19 and the Precarity of International Investment Law’, The IEL Collective Series
on Medium, 6 May 2020 https://medium.com/iel-collective/covid-19-and-the-precarity-of-internationa
l-investment-law-c9fc254b3878.
99 ICSID rules for example can also apply to contract-based arbitration.
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in his contribution,100 this change, albeit tumultuous, has not yet reached the tipping
point. While these tendencies are unfolding because the interests of both (traditional)
rule-taker and rule-makers are progressively matching, these are still not enough, and a
more profound ‘disintegration’ of the previous order would be necessary for the public
interest—in a broader sense—to be upheld.
Interestingly, the disintegration of the international investment regime occurs at
the time when China is attempting to build its own web of investment relations. In
this sense, a somewhat more informal method of disengagement (or ‘differentiated’
engagement) can be detected in the new ‘decentralized’ system implemented through
theBelt andRoad Initiative (BRI),which ismainly aimedat infrastructuredevelopment
and investment.101 This system relies heavily on a complex web of financing, legal, and
economic relations mostly lightly regulated, via bilateral instruments such as Memo-
randa of Understanding (MoUs) and private contracts, which are typically removed
from international scrutiny and managed via softer dispute settlement mechanisms.
Arguably, similar more informal constructs were already in place and largely used in
the context of development projects co-financed bymultiple international and regional
development banks and export credit agencies. The difference with the BRI, however,
seems to lie in the sort of consensus conveyed through the latter operations. The BRI
does not aim at achieving deep(er) economic integration, rather it is mostly limited to
market access and seemingly seeking to create an alternativeChinese (world) economic
order.102 More generally, besides their substantive function, Memoranda of Under-
standing and other sorts of non-binding treaties are problematic from a taxonomic and
structural perspective.These instruments tend todrive an institutionalwedgeof unclear
nature and effects. This is all the more relevant, considering that MoUs are becoming
increasingly common inother areas.103Whilenon-binding treatiesmightbe considered
a more malleable instrument of harmonization and coordination among States, due
to their ‘agility’ these can easily lend themselves to discretion and arbitrariness, and
ultimately act as a disintegrating factor.104
100 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, ‘Disintegration and Change in the International Law on Foreign Invest-
ment’ in this Issue.
101 Extensively Gregory Shaffer and Henry Gao, ‘A New Chinese Economic Law Order?’ School of Law
University of California Irvine Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2019–21; Maria Adele Carrai,
‘It is Not the End of History: The Financing Institutions of the BRI and the Bretton Woods System’ 3
TransnationalDispute Settlement (2017);more generally on theBRI,MariaAdeleCarrai, Jean-Christophe
De Fraigne and Jan Wouters (eds), The Belt and Road Initiative and Global Governance (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, 2020).
102 Shaffer andGao, above n 101, at 40. Admittedly, at themoment this system coexists with the very extensive
BIT network of China.
103 Notably, within the EU at various levels, featuring mostly in the EMU area. Cf. ext on this Anastasia
Karatzia and Theodore Konstadinides, ‘The Legal Nature and Character ofMemoranda of Understanding
as Instruments used by the European Central Bank’ 44(4) European Law Review 447 (2019).
104 Professor Enzo Cannizzaro put forward this argument in the presentation, entitled ‘The disintegrationist
effect of non-binding political agreements in International andEULaw’, given at the conferencementioned
in the opening footnote.
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Finally, even the European construct, which is by any measure the most advanced
(and theorized)105 example of international economic integration, is experiencing
a wide range of visible disintegration phenomena, which also appear as an effect
of disintegration through law phenomena. This proposition is very much in line
with recent attempts to explain EU disintegration. Relying on Polanyi’s idea of dis-
embeddedness,106 scholars have argued that the focus on the economic aspects
of the EU has ignored political identity and community building, even when the
‘European project transcended its economic origin’.107 As such, the EU serves both as a
laboratory and a magnifying glass to observe the integration/disintegration dynamics,
and shows that integration is neither linear nor immutable. Within the broad notion of
disintegration adopted by this study it is possible to include the recent—steadily more
frequent—disregard for the rule of law principles enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty
of the European Union.108 This is to a large extent due to the rise of nationalist and
‘illiberal’ governments in someMember States. But, as shown by Panicos Demetriades
and Radosveta Vassileva,109 the neglect of these values is not limited to such States.
The enforcement of EU Anti-Money Laundering rules in Cyprus and Malta is a case
in point. Relevant EU rules are admittedly insufficient to guarantee the independence
of AML supervisors, which in turns generates a decay of the rule of law. Similarly, the
recent withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU can be seen as another notable
105 There are now several studies looking at ‘disintegration’ of the EU, albeit from different perspectives. Legal
studies have rather focused on ‘differentiated’ or ‘multi-speed’ integration, while international relations and
economics have focused on the foundation and premises of the integration project. See amongst others
Bruno de Witte (ed), Between Flexibility and Disintegration. The Trajectory of Differentiation (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, 2017); Erik Jones ‘Towards a Theory of Disintegration’ 25(3) Journal of European Public
Policy 440 (2018); Barbara Kunz, ‘Integration, Disintegration and the International System. A Realist
Perspective on Push and Pull Factors in European Integration’, in Annegret Eppler and Henrik Scheller
(eds),Zur Konzeptionalisierung europäischer Desintegration, (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2013) 71–86;Matthew
C. Turk, ‘Implications of EuropeanDisintegration for International Law’ 17Columbia Journal of European
Law 1 (2010).
106 Liesbeth Hooghe and GaryMarks, ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive
Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’, 39(1) British Journal of Political Science 1 (2009). Traditionally,
European integrationhasbeen considered a creatureof ‘(neo)functionalism,’which in the context of theEU
could be synthesized as the idea that the integration of certain areas would create spill-over effects on other
adjacent fields, ultimately conducing to an ‘ever-closer’ integration, an assumption originated withMonnet
and to a certain extent maintained by Delors. Scholars have argued, however, that more than a normative
theorization of integration, (neo)functionalismhas in fact—at least for a certain period of time—described
a development in the status quo. See Turk, above n 105, at 22.
107 More specifically, even if presented or perceived as a liberal process that would have disentangled domestic
political interests from a supra-national project, it has failed to account for how certain arrangements
actually perpetuate a division between national interests, very much exemplified by the recent turbulent
reaction to Covid-19. Jones above n 105, at 441.
108 Since the establishment of the EU rule of law framework, both the preventive and corrective mechanisms
under Article 7 TEU have been triggered on several occasions. See Dimitry Kochenov and Laurent Pech,
‘Better Late than Never? On the European Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and its First Activation’,
54 (5) Journal of CommonMarket Studies 1062 (2016); Laurent Pech andKimL. Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism
Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’, 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3 (2017).
109 Panicos Demetriades and Radosveta Vassileva, ‘Money Laundering and Central Bank Governance in the
European Union’ in this Issue.
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manifestation of that nationalist response to the flaws of deep international economic
integration.110
The Economic andMonetary Union (EMU) is also treading on dangerous grounds
since the outbreak of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Considered as the jewel in the
crown of European integration, it soon became the most frequent source of turbulence
for the Union. As evidenced by Massimo D’Antoni,111 the design flaws of the EMU,
notably the absence of common fiscal capacity and the single mandate of the European
Central Bank (ECB), have come home to roost. Instead of paving the way for full
political integration, as anticipated by the promoters of this project, it has widened
the cleavage between ‘periphery’112 and ‘core’ countries.113 Caught in the grip of
high unemployment and high public debt, periphery114 (and not so periphery)115
countries are growing disaffected with the EMU and, ultimately, with the EU—the
withdrawal from the European Union is no longer taboo.116 At the same time, the
extraordinary monetary measures117 adopted by the ECB, and backed by the Court
of Justice, to make up for these flaws, have in turn elicited the reaction of national
governments and national constitutional courts. A long and often uneasy dialogue118
between the CJEU and the German constitutional court has recently culminated in a
Bundesverfassungsgericht decision119 that, defying the principle of primacy of EU law,
casts doubts on the compatibility with both the German Constitution and the EU
110 Italo Colantone and Pietro Stanig above n 56, at 209–214; Thomas Sampson, ‘Brexit: The Economics of
International Disintegration’, 31(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 163 (2017), at 175–180.
111 Massimo D’Antoni, ‘FromMonetary to Fiscal to Political Union: a Progression to Integration or a Recipe
for Failure?’, in this Issue.
112 Southern European States, such as Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal are often referred to as ‘periphery’
countries.
113 This term generally includes Germany and other northern European States, such as the Netherlands,
Finland, and Austria.
114 See, e.g. Rosa Balfour and Lorenzo Robustelli, ‘Why Did Italy Fall Out of Love with Europe?’, IAI
Commentaries, IAI Commentaries, 2019, https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom1948.pdf .
115 The case of France is paradigmatic in this respect. See Michel Onfray, Grandeur du petit peuple: Heurs et
malheurs des Gilets jaunes (Paris: Éditions AlbinMichel, 2020).
116 The discontent toward the European Monetary Union is somewhat reminiscent of that against the Gold
Standard in the late 19th Century in the US. See Jeffry A. Frieden, ‘Monetary Populism in Nineteenth
CenturyAmerica:AnOpenEconomy Interpretation’, 57 (2)The Journal ofEconomicHistory 367 (1997);
HughRockoff, ‘TheWizard ofOz as aMonetaryAllegory’, 98 (4) Journal of Political Economy739 (1990).
117 Decision (EU) 2015/774, OJ 2015, L 121/20; ECB, ‘Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transac-
tions’, 6 September 2012, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html.
118 See, amongst others, Edmondo Mostacci, ‘La sindrome di Francoforte: crisi del debito, costituzione
finanziaria europea e torsioni del costituzionalismo democratico’, 4 Politica del Diritto (2013), at 530–
532; Mattias Kumm, ‘Rebel Without a Good Cause: Karlsruhe’s Misguided Attempt to Draw the CJEU
into aGame of “Chicken” andWhat theCJEUMight doAbout It’, 15(2)German Law Journal 203 (2014),
at 208–214; Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘The OMT Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court
Repositioning the Court within the European Constitutional Architecture’, 13 European Constitutional
Law Review 400 (2017).
119 BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 5 May 2020–2 BvR 859/15 -, paras (1–237). See Marco Dani,
JoanaMendes, Agustin J. Menendez, Michael Wilkinson, Harm Schepel and Edoardo Chiti, ‘At the End of
the Law: AMoment of Truth for the Eurozone and the EU’, 15May 2020, https://verfassungsblog.de/at-
the-end-of-the-law/;Marijn van der Sluis, ‘Karlsruhe bites with a vengeance’, 5May 2002, https://eulawli
ve.com/analysis-karlsruhe-bites-with-a-vengeance-by-marijn-van-der-sluis/.
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Treaties of the ECB’s quantitative easing programme.120 As argued above for theWTO,
the combination of these disruptive events does not allow any further inaction. But the
need for action brings with it the question of whether future reforms should go toward
a deeper integration between EU States or lighter and diversified forms of integration.
Menelaos Markakis121 seems to opt for the former option, although he underlines the
importance of the flexibilities set out in the EUTreaties. But, as the divergence between
Member States increases, ‘diversified integration’ recipes might gain wider currency.122
C. Disintegration as an iterative process
Remaining truthful to our iterative understanding of disintegration of law and dis-
integration through law, we maintain that the divide existing between international
economic governance and socio-economic and environmental issues is reflected and
perpetuated in the very construction of legal categories. In other words, the isolation
of the social123 and environmental questions is enshrined in the current structure of
international law and in theway certainmatters are organized normatively. In this sense,
the regulative separation between trade (or investment) values fromnon-trade values is
almost automatic for international economic law scholars. This is very much reflected
in the phenomenon of fragmentation, whereby different fields of law develop separately
their own sets of rules only to interact when conflicting. Granted, law needs categories
to be able to interpret facts and attach consequences.
However, here the risk is twofold. First, this separationhas so far generated a lopsided
structure of comparatively weaker international regimes on social and environmental
issues. Second, this surgical division of categories becomes an unuseful taxonomic
instrument, imposing artificial distinctions, which are unsustainable in the long term.
Scholars have already articulated how the distinction between trade and non-trade
values is reproduced and magnified in the fragmentation discourse. This discourse in
fact normalizes the idea by which certain matters, environment, labor, human rights
do not ‘belong’ to the international economic integration project, thus neglecting their
interconnectedness and perpetuating the separation.124 Fragmentation, albeit articu-
lated as a critique, still forces us to look at the very same fact of life from a different
set of perspectives and try to find solutions in harmonization techniques, which are
120 Decision (EU) 2015/774, above n 117.
121 Menelaos Markakis, ‘Disintegration in the EU: Brexit, the Eurozone Crisis, and Other Troubles’, in this
Issue.
122 See, amongst others, Daniel Thym, ‘Competing Models of Understanding Differentiated Integration’, in
Bruno De Witte, Andrea Ott and Ellen Vos (eds), Between Flexibility and Disintegration: The Trajectory of
Differentiation in EU Law (Cheltenham-Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2017); Majone, above n 18, at 295–
322.
123 Orford above n 47.
124 See the critique of the trade-linkage literature in Lang, above n 7, at 538; AlessandraArcuri, ‘OnBoundaries
of International Investment Law as Mechanisms to Exclude Human Rights and Sustainable Investment’,
paper presented at the Conference on ‘Socially Responsible Foreign Investment under International Law’,
Católica Global School of Law, Lisbon, 24–25 October 2019 and at the Conference on ‘The Legitimate
Role for InvestmentLawandArbitration inProtectingHumanRights’,MonashUniversity and theMinerva
Centre for Human Rights at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tøyen hovedgård, Oslo, 4–5 September
2019 on file with the author.
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still a second best and not always viable.125 Suffice to think of the same exact source
of dispute litigated first as an investment case before an arbitral tribunal, and as a
human right one before a HR court.126 In other terms, while fragmentation takes this
separation of categories as a given and acts from there, we argue that the disintegrat-
ing factor lies already at the conceptual level, in the way categories are created and
constructed.
III. CONCLUSION:WHATAWAITSUSAFTERDISINTEGRATION?
Awide range of disintegrationphenomenahas crippled international economic integra-
tion over the last few years.We have argued that the current ‘integrationist’ architecture
of the international economic order has spurred disintegration through law—namely
socio-economic and environmental disintegration—which in turn triggers disintegra-
tion of law, undermining the very existence of international economic regimes. This
Special Issue is devoted to investigating these interrelated phenomena.
Instances of both disintegration of law and through law did not (so far at least)
materialize in a coherent and comprehensive articulation of alternative(s). Reactions
have been sparse, and the way forward seems to be a trial and error path rather than an
orderly plan. In other words, disintegration did not comewith a ‘manual of destruction’
or a roadmap to navigate. ‘Unqualified’ disintegration generates a sort of horror vacui
and leaves it to the caprice of power politics. The contributions to this Special Issue
try to make sense of this remarkable series of events from a variety of perspectives,
often reaching diametrically opposed conclusions. Some welcome disintegration as an
opportunity for change, some acknowledge the need for change to avert disintegration.
However, what all contributions have in common is the acknowledgement that the
status quo is eroding quickly, and a direction needs to be taken tomove forward. Hence,
the encouragement is not to give in to what has been described as the deprivation of
imagining alternatives.127
In an attempt to make sense of the normative preferences articulated in this Special
Issue, we have identified (at the risk of over generalizing) five general propositions. The
first is the idea of the ‘repatriation’ of competences, which is a ‘return’ to the State as the
125 See also Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal Education’ 1
European Journal of Legal Studies 1 (2007).
126 A clear example here is the Sarayaku case before Inter-AmericanCourt of Human Rights, ‘Pueblo Indígena
Kichwa de Sarayaku v Republic of Ecuador. Case No. 12.465. Judgment on Merits and Reparations, 27
June 2012 and the parallel investor-State arbitration in the Texaco Chevron saga, specifically the parallel
Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCACase
No. 2009–23 First Partial Award on Track I, 17 September 2013. No mention is to find in either of the
decisions of the other proceeding.Other examplesmight be the simultaneous negotiations on ISDS reform
and on a Business andHumanRights treaty, which are carried out separately; similar considerations can be
articulated as to the surgical and asymmetrical separation between the regulation of movement of goods
and capital, and themovement of persons, which has arguably contributed toward fuelling illegalmigration,
on this seeChantalThomas, ‘Migration and International EconomicAsymmetry’ inAlvaro Santos,Chantal
Thomas and David Trubek (eds)World Trade and Investment Law Reimagined A Progressive Agenda for an
Inclusive Globalization (London: Anthem Press, 2019), 241–256; Peters, above n 57.
127 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Virus: All That Is Solid Melts into Air’, Critical Legal Thinking, 19 March
2020, https://criticallegalthinking.com/2020/03/19/virus-all-that-is-solid-melts-into-air/.
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main place of decision-making. The second is the conceptualization of a (re)embedded
liberalism in a multilateral dimension, that is the idea of addressing certain compelling
issues in existing multilateral frameworks. The third could be defined as progressive
‘managed’ integration, half-way between deep integration and reshoring, with more ad
hoc solutions in the short-termand the possibility to extend themmultilaterally at a later
stage. The fourth one advances an inversion of scope with the regulation of the market
being subservient to social and environmental issues, rather than ‘embedding’ these
issues in market regulation. The last could be indicated as a ‘participatory’ approach,
in that these solutions identify the site of democratic decision-making in the affected
stakeholders at a subnational and transnational level, rather than in the nation-state.
All these solutions present advantages and disadvantages, both from a substantive
and pragmatic perspective. The idea of the return to the State might conceal both
the (now highly visible) risk of autocratic power grab, but also ‘de-responsibilize’
international economic law of its central role in the attainment of public purposes.
On the other hand, a (re)-embedded multilateralism might still risk obliterating the
‘perspective of the oppressed,’ and maintaining the traditional divides between ‘trade
and non-trade issues’. Solutions that rest on bilateralism—albeit in the short-term—
may advance more progressive agendas, such as a stronger active industrial policy and
be more achievable, while risking to fragment the response.
Whatever positiononemay takeon this issue, it shouldbe admitted that thediffusion
on a global scale of an unexpected and deadly disease, if anything, would impart
acceleration to the ‘wreckingball’ of disintegration.What has become immediately clear
after the outbreak ofCovid-19 is that the closely interdependent and fast-moving ‘world
of yesterday’ has been put on hold and it is not clear what the ‘world of tomorrow’ will
look like.128 What is clear, instead, the slowing down of virtually all economic activities
has plunged the world economy into a huge recession and brought unemployment
to unprecedented levels around the world. The international economic order, in its
various manifestations, should reinvent and adapt itself to this new state of things. Its
reshaping should be premised on the full realization that economic integration entails
a great deal of environmental and social ‘hidden costs,’129 which should guide the
128 Zachary Karabell, ‘Will the Coronavirus Bring the End of Globalization? Don’t Count on It’, The Wall
Street Journal, 20 March 2020; Adam J. White, ‘Deregulate for the Coronavirus Recovery The Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs should think hard about which rules to enforce’, WSJ Opinion, 3 May
2020; Carson Block, ‘Bans on short selling are handouts to the “corporate socialists”’ Financial Times,
26 March 2020; Adam Tooze, ‘The Death of Globalisation has been Announced Many Times. But this
is a Perfect Storm’, The Guardian, 2 June 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/ju
n/02/end-globalisation-covid-19-made-it-real.
129 More generally, Ricardo’s theory of competitive advantage has somehow always excluded vital interests
from the formula, and reduced them to ‘hidden costs’. More recently, it has been argued that this theory
allows for social inequalities to be reproduced for example in the labor market and in some ways it
renders invisible ‘the contribution that social reproductive, informal/informalized labor andenvironmental
resources make to the transnational creation, extraction, and distribution of economic value’, Donatella
Alessandrini, ‘Value-capture, Development and Social Reproduction in International Trade Law’ Verfas-
sungsblog, 4 March 2020. The notion of hidden costs is somehow related to the value of goods and
services. For a summary of the debate between objective and subjectives conceptions of value, seeMariana
Mazzuccato, The Value of Everything (London: Penguin, 2018) 58–71.
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reconceptualization of the international economic order.130 Onemay wonder whether
the international economic order needs to fail spectacularly to unleash the forces of
innovation and bold thinking.131 Perhaps, but, if anything, history teaches us that
spectacular failures should be avoided rather than awaited.
130 International law offers quite concrete examples of what a significant difference it makes to start from
drastically different ‘understandings’ in the construction of legal regimes. While seemingly not relevant,
thinking e.g. of the difference between the principle of common heritage of mankind and the freedom
of high seas in Law of the Sea can help grasp concretely how compelling this issue is. Endorsing the first
principle implies an abandonment of the market logic and a regulated (administered) access to resources,
benefit, and burden sharing; the second implies instead freedom of access, to be regulated only to correct
externalities. While the first implies distributive justice in its own conceptualization, the second is not per
se concernedwith it, if not in an adjustment phase. Endorsing one or the other has therefore significant and
very concrete consequences at the operational level. This is not to say we should just import the common
heritageofmankind in international economic law, it is rather to showhow fundamental it is to focusonhow
weconceptualize regimes. See on this EllenHey, ‘ConceptualizingGlobalNaturalResources:Global Public
GoodsTheory and International LegalConcepts’, inHolger P.Hestermeyer,DorisKönig,NeleMatz-Lück,
Volker Röben, Anja Seibert-Fohr, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Silja Vöneky (eds), Coexistence, Cooperation and
Solidarity. Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum (Leiden-Boston: Brill - Martinus Nijhoff, 2011). 881–899.
131 Paul Watzlawick,Ultra-Solutions, or, How to Fail Most Successfully (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988).
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